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Abstract
This paper studies a dynamic trade institution, where an auction is combined with a
“Buy-It-Now” option. This option presentsa take-it-or-leave-itprice offered by the seller
to a potential bidder before the auction. If the buyer rejects this buyout price, the object
is auctioned off. In equilibrium, sales should only take place in the auction. An ex-
perimental test reveals that average buyout prices and proﬁts are well captured by the
theoretical prediction. However, a substantial amount of sales takes place before the
auction. This is caused by offering (too) low or accepting (too) high buyout prices. We
discuss alternative explanations, as risk preferences and (wrong) formation of beliefs
that might account for agents’ behavior.
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11 Introduction
Traditionally, bargaining and ﬁxed price trading have been analyzed separately from auc-
tions. More recently, attention has been directed to the analysis of strategic interaction in
hybrid environments combining auctions and negotiations. One example of such a hybrid
environment is a seller who negotiates the sale of a good with a small number of buyers,
before, in case of disagreement, auctioning off the good to a broader set of agents. Such a
sequential mechanism is the focus of the current paper.
One of the reasons for the growing interest in combined mechanisms is their increasing
use by successful internet auction sites like eBay, Yahoo, and Amazon.1 Those internet plat-
forms employ a selling mechanism where a call for bids in an auction is combined with a
take-it-or-leave-it price offer.2 For example, at Yahoo and Amazon, sellers have the possi-
bility to offer their products throughout the auction at a permanent buyout price. At eBay,
a seller may announce a temporary buyout price, the so called Buy-It-Now price, addition-
ally to the call for bids. Once a buyer accepts the Buy-It-Now offer, the sale is concluded at
this price. Otherwise, a buyer can start the auction by submitting a bid, in which case the
buyout price disappears and the ﬁnal price is determined by the auction. Shortly after the
introduction of the Buy-It-Now option in November 2000, eBay reported that 30%, 35% and
even 45% (eBay Q1, Q2 and Q4 2001) of all listings in eBay auctions included a Buy-It-Now
option. Similar ﬁgures have been reported by Reynolds and Wooders (2006) who observe
40% of auctions with a Buy-It-Now offer. The economic relevance of such hybrid mecha-
nisms is reﬂected in the volume of transactions. eBay, for example, reported that ﬁxed price
trades on their sites comprised 4.4 billion USD in the ﬁrst half of 2004 translating to 28% of
the total Gross Merchandize Volume.3
Early theoretical analysis fails to explain these observations. For example, Bulow and
Klemperer (1996) hypothesize that “... if a seller could negotiate with N bidders while main-
tainingtherighttosubsequentlyholdanEnglishauctionwithoutareservepriceandwithan
additionalbidder, thesellerwouldalwaysdobettertoproceeddirectlytotheauction.”(page
182), a conjecture in clear contrast to the behavior observed in reality.4
More recently, Kirkegaard (2004) reconsiders the results by Bulow and Klemperer and
shows that the English auction can be improved by negotiations prior to the auction if buy-
ers are asymmetric or the marginal revenue is non-monotonic. Mathews (2004) shows that
1http://www.ebay.com; http://www.yahoo.com; http://www.amazon.com
2A take-it-or-leave-it price offer, also known as ultimatum bargaining, constitutes one of the simplest of all
bargaining procedures (Binmore, 1992, p.197). In the literature on combined mechanisms such a price offer is
often referred to as “Buy-It-Now price” (as on eBay), “buyout price” or “buy price.” We will use these terms
interchangeably.
3Two selling formats on eBay lead to a ﬁxed price trade – an auction with a Buy-It-Now price or a pure
ﬁxed price (the item is listed at a set price and bidding is not possible). According to eBay, acceptance of the
Buy-It-Now price before an auction is the primary contributor to the ﬁxed price trades.
4See Kirkegaard (2006) for a general proof.
2the probability of successful settlements using the buyout option increases with the impa-
tience of either sellers or buyers. eBay, for example, indicates that the average auction du-
ration decreased by almost 10% which, according to eBay, is due to an increased use of the
Buy-It-Now option (eBay, Q4 2002). This provides some evidence, although not conclusive,
supporting the impatience hypothesis.
Risk preferences can also account for the success of the buyout option. For example,
Reynolds and Wooders (2006) compare eBay and Yahoo auctions where a buyout price is
offered to all buyers, simultaneously. They show that the riskiness of the auction as an out-
side option can contrive risk averse buyers to accept buyout prices that are higher than the
expected price from the auction. Alternatively, Mathews and Katzman (2006) demonstrate
that risk averse sellers prefer an agreement at the buy price by asking for lower prices than
those expected from the auction. Budish and Takeyama (2001) look at Yahoo and Amazon
auctions and show that risk neutral sellers can increase their proﬁts by offering a permanent
buy price during the auction to risk averse buyers. Likewise, Hidv´ egi, Wang and Whinston
(2006) consider permanent buy prices allowing for risk aversion of both, sellers and buyers.
They show that properly set buy prices increase social welfare and expected utility of all
agents.
In this study, we focus on auctions with a temporary buyout price such as, for example,
used on eBay. In those auctions, buyers arrive at different points in time and there is always
a “decisive buyer” who will either accept the buyout price or start the auction by submit-
ting a bid. In the latter case, the buyout price disappears, hence buyers arriving later are not
informed about the rejected price offer. They can only participate in the auction.5 Therefore,
in contrast to the literature mentioned above, we propose to treat buyers asymmetrically.
More precisely, we consider a two-stage mechanism, where the seller offers a buyout price
to only one of the buyers. If this buyer rejects, a second–price sealed–bid auction with ad-
ditional buyers takes place. We test experimentally whether actual behavior in a controlled
environment exhibits similar qualitative properties as the theoretical prediction: All sales
will take place in the auction, since sellers will post buyout prices that are too high to be
accepted.
There are some empirical and experimental papers studying the Buy-It-Now option on
eBay. However, these papers are examining this issue in contexts quite different than we
are concerned with here. For example, Anderson, Friedman, Milam and Singh (2004) collect
transactions data from auctions conducted on eBay and study the impact of the character-
istics of the seller, the good, and the transaction on seller’s choice of selling format. Using
a ﬁeld experiment, Durham, Roelofs and Standiﬁrd (2004) look at the impact of buyer rep-
utation, seller reputation, and the magnitude of the Buy-It-Now price on buyer behavior.
5Note that this combined procedure resembles the situation considered by Bulow and Klemperer (1996): A
seller can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a buyer who might either accept or reject the offer. In the latter
case, a second buyer joins and a second–price auction takes place. (Section II.C “Negotiations followed by an
auction,” page 189.)
3Our point of concern is to understand why such dynamic trade forms exist at the ﬁrst place.
Therefore, we test the theoretical prediction in an environment controlling for valuations of
buyers and sellers as well as for the private value character of the good for sale.
Our experimental results show that average prices and proﬁts are well described by the
theoretical prediction. However, we observe a substantial amount of sales at the buyout
price and a substantial portion of buyout prices well below the theoretical prediction. Our
experimental design excludes time preferences as an explanation for the observed behav-
ior. Therefore, we investigate whether and to which extent risk preferences can help to
resolve the puzzle. The literature on buyout options so far has investigated the role of risk
aversion either for permanent buyout prices (Hidv´ egi, Wang and Whinston, 2006) or in the
case of temporary buyout prices only for one market side (Mathews and Katzman, 2006,
and Reynolds and Wooders, 2006). We study outcomes of auctions with temporary buyout
prices allowing for risk aversion on both market sides.
We show that by relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality for both, sellers and buyers,
successful sales at the buyout price can occur in equilibrium. Using existing population esti-
mates of risk preferences we provide quantitative predictions for the distribution of sellers’
buyout prices. We ﬁnd that including risk preferences can only partly account for agents’
behavior: It improves the ﬁt for buyers, but is not sufﬁcient to explain sellers’ deviations
from equilibrium buyout prices. More than one third of all observed buyout prices lie out-
side the predicted price range indicating systematically under- and overpricing. Therefore,
we discuss the role of belief formation and learning in order to understand and to explain
agents’ decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
benchmark predictions. The experimental design and procedure are presented in section
3. Section 4 contains the analysis of the experimental results. In section 5 we investigate
whether and to what extent incorporating risk attitudes into the model can explain our
experimental data. In section 6 we discuss alternative behavioral concepts. Section 7 con-
cludes.
2 Theoretical Background: Model and Predictions
We consider a situation where a seller offers a single indivisible object for sale to n poten-
tial buyers.6 The seller’s valuation is common knowledge and, for simplicity, normalized
to zero. Buyers’ valuations for the good, vi with i = 1,...,n, are independent random vari-
ables and private information. The seller announces a take-it-or-leave-it offer, i.e., a buyout
price p, to one randomly selected buyer, whom we will refer to as “buyer 1.” If the offer is
accepted, the sale takes place at this price. If it is rejected, a second–price sealed–bid auction
without a reserve price and with all n buyers is conducted. In this case, buyers place their
6We thank Ren´ e Kirkegaard and an anonymous referee for suggestions in this section.
4bids simultaneously. The bidder who submits the highest bid is awarded the object and
pays a price equal to the second highest bid. The other bidders have zero payoffs.
The question arises whether the seller might beneﬁt from the buyout option in the com-
bined mechanism. In case of symmetric bidders and continuous valuations, a pure second–
price auction without reserve price is optimal, i.e., maximizes the seller’s revenue, subject
to the constraint that the good is sold with probability one. In a second–price auction, every
bidder truthfully reveals his private valuation. Hence, the object will always be allocated to
the buyer with the highest value. If the combined mechanism leads to the same allocation
of the good and agents are risk neutral, it will yield the same expected revenue to the seller
(Myerson, 1981). In the combined mechanism, however, there is a positive probability that
buyer 1 receives the object regardless whether he has the highest value or not. This implies
that the second–price auction without reserve price and the combined mechanism are not
revenue equivalent. Since the second–price auction is optimal, the seller prefers in any case
to sell in the auction.
More precisely, the interaction between seller and buyer 1 before the auction is limited
to offering a take-it-or-leave-it price and the reaction to it. Buyer 1 will accept the buyout
price if his payoff is at least as good as the expected payoff from participating in the auction.
That is
v1 ¡ p ¸
³
v1 ¡ E[V(2)jmaxj6=1 Vj < v1]
´
Pr(maxj6=1 Vj < v1) (1)
where j denotes one of the f2,...,ng bidders, v1 buyer 1’s valuation, V(2) the second highest
valuation of all bidders, Pr(v1 > maxj6=1 Vj) the probability that buyer 1 has the highest
valuation of all bidders and E[¢] is the expectation operator. This means that buyer 1 will
only accept prices p which are smaller or equal to a threshold price e p(v1) satisfying:
p · e p(v1) = E[V(2)jmaxj6=1 Vj < v1)]Pr(maxj6=1 Vj < v1) +
v1 ¢ (1¡ Pr(maxj6=1 Vj < v1)). (2)
Accordingly, a threshold value, e v(p), can be derived for each price offer p. If the value of
buyer 1 lays above e v(p), he would accept the buyout price and reject otherwise.
Letusﬁrstconsiderthespecialcaseofsymmetricinformationbetweensellerandbuyer1
when analyzing the seller’s decision problem. Given that the seller knows the valuation of
buyer 1, he could improve his expected proﬁt by asking for a buyout price p fulﬁlling the
following inequality:
e p(v1) ¸ p > E[V(2)jmaxj6=1 Vj < v1]Pr(maxj6=1 Vj < v1) +
E[V(2)jmaxj6=1 Vj < v1](1¡ Pr(maxj6=1 Vj < v1)), (3)
Since E[V(2)jmaxj6=1 Vj < v1] ¸ v1, inequalities (2) and (3) cannot be satisﬁed simultane-
ously. Consequently, there exists no buyout price at which seller and buyer 1 could reach an
agreement.
5This will also be true under asymmetric information, i.e., when the valuation is pri-
vate information of buyer 1. Since the seller never wants to reach an agreement before the
auction, he should ask for a buyout price above the threshold price of the bidder with the
highest valuation.
Inthefollowing, wederivetheclosedformsolutionfortheparametersusedintheexper-
iment, which will be used as benchmark prediction. In the experiment, valuations of n = 2
buyers were drawn from the uniform distribution with support [0,1], where we denote by
F(x) = x and by f(x) = 1, the cumulative distribution function of each buyers’ values and
its probability distribution function, respectively. Buyer 1 will accept a buyout price if
v1 ¸ e v(p) =
(
1¡
p
1¡ 2p if 0 · p < 1/2
1 if 1/2 · p · 1 .
(4)
The optimal buyout prices are given by p¤ = argp(e v(p) = 1), which yields 1/2 · p¤ · 1,
that will never be accepted. If the seller asked for a buyout price below 1/2 this would
lead to an adverse selection effect lowering the expected outcome of the combined mecha-
nism. High value buyers accept buyout prices whereas low value buyers go to the auction.
Therefore, the fact that a buyout price below 1/2 has been rejected or accepted, reveals in-
formation about buyer 1’s valuation, allowing the seller to update his information about the
support of the valuation of buyer 1 and therefore his expected proﬁt from the auction.
More precisely, the seller’s maximization problem is
p¤ = argmax
p2[0,1]
PS(p) = p
Z 1
e v(p)
f(x)dx +
Z e v(p)
0
yg(1)(y, e v(p))dy
Z e v(p)
0
f(x)dx, (5)
where the seller updates his information about the expected value from the auction by tak-
ing into account that either one or both bidders’ valuations lay in the interval [0, e v(p)],
whereby g(1)(y, e v(p)) denotes the density function of the ﬁrst order statistic with one or
two random variables in this interval.7
Since sales will always take place in the auction, ex ante expected earnings are 1/3 for
the seller and 1/6 for each buyer.
3 Experiment
In the experiment, each participant was either a buyer or a seller. One seller and two buyers
constituted a trading group. The composition of the trading groups was changed between
periods: Each period sellers and buyers were rematched randomly. An experimental session
consisted of 32 periods, which can be divided into four cycles of eight trading periods. Each
buyer was in the role of buyer 1 either in the odd or the even cycles, i.e., in 16 out of the
32 periods. In all other periods a buyer joined the auction only if the price offer had been
7See Rohatgi (1987) for distributions of order statistics with random sample size. For the problem here,
g(1)(y, e v(p)) = (1+ e v(p) ¡ 2y)/e v(p).
6rejected. Buyers’ private reselling values for the product were randomly and independently
drawn from the set V = f0,1,2,...,99,100g with all vi 2 V being equally likely. Participants
could choose integer buyout prices and bids between 0 and 100. All values were denoted in
a ﬁctitious currency termed ECU for Experimental Currency Unit.8
In the beginning of a single period the trading groups were formed and sellers were
asked to submit their buyout price offer. The buyer who was in the role of buyer 1 was
informed about his private value and the buyout price. After buyer 1 had accepted or re-
jected the buyout price, each group member was told whether or not a sale had taken place.
If the price offer was accepted, the sale occured and there was no auction. If the buyout
price was rejected, the other buyer was informed about his private value and a second–
price sealed–bid auction with both buyers took place. All group members were informed
about the outcome of the auction: who won the auction, the price paid by the winner, and
their own payoff in the current period. Buyers who attended only the auction were not in-
formed about the buyout price. At the end of a period, each participant received an account
of the own total proﬁt up to this period. In a post–experimental questionnaire participants
answered standard demographic questions and were asked to comment brieﬂy on their rea-
soning during the experiment.
The experiment comprised 10 sessions with a total of 90 participants. We conducted
10 sessions, half of them with 6 and the other half with 12 participants each. We pooled the
data from the sessions of different sizes since we did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences between
them.9 All experimental sessions were computerized and the software system was cre-
ated with z-Tree (Fischbacher, forthcoming). The experiment was conducted at Humboldt-
University Berlin, Germany, and most participants were students of economics, business
administration, law, and physics. One session lasted on average 90 min. The conversion
rate of ECU earned by each participant into cash was: 1 ECU = 0.0125 EUR. Participants’
total earnings ranged between 8.05 EUR to 16.86 EUR with a mean of 11.82 EUR (as a seller:
13.14 EUR, as a buyer: 11.15 EUR).10
4 Results
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the experimental outcomes for all periods and, in or-
dertoillustratethechangesovertime, forallcycles. Foreaseofcomparisontothetheoretical
benchmark, we report our results for normalized valuations, i.e., all experimental outcomes
are transformed from the [0,100] to the [0,1]–range. In total we observe 960 trades. Average
buyout prices (column 1) with p = 0.51 as well as average earnings for sellers and buyers
8See appendix A for a shortened and translated version of the instructions. Complete sets of the original
instructions (in German) are available upon request.
9The p-value of Mann-Whitney U Tests (henceforth MWU) on session averages concerning price offers, ac-
ceptance rates, ﬁnal sale prices and efﬁciencies ranges between 0.22 and 1.
10These numbers include a starting capital for buyers of 5 EUR.
7with 0.33 and 0.15 (columns 3) are rather stable over time and in line with the theoretical
prediction.11 The object was allocated to the buyer with the highest valuation in 85% of all
sales (column 4). Since in the combined mechanism buyer 1 receives the object with positive
probability, regardless whether he has the highest value or not, one might expect efﬁciency
to be lower than in a pure second-price auction. However, the observed share of efﬁcient
allocations is quite comparable to those reported in other second–price sealed–bid auction
experiments with two bidders (e.g., 88% (G¨ uth, Ivanova-Stenzel and Wolfstetter, 2005), 91%
(Pezanis-Christou, 2002)).
These results show that experimental outcomes are on average well captured by the
benchmark prediction. However, contrary to the theoretical prediction, we observe one
third of all sales taking place at the buyout price, i.e., before the auction (see column 2 of
Table 1).12 In order to better understand these ﬁndings, we continue with a more detailed
analysis of the data. More precisely, we will ﬁrst investigate buyers’ bidding behavior in the
auction and continue with their acceptance behavior of the buyout price before we turn our
attention to sellers’ price setting behavior.
Bidding should (theoretically) not be inﬂuenced by the buyout option since bidding the
own value is a weakly dominant strategy. Experiencing the buyout option before the auc-
tion seems indeed not to change bidding behavior in the auction. Despite some slight over-
and underbidding, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences between bids and the predicted
equilibrium bidding strategy. In fact, half of all observed bids are equal to subjects’ val-
uations. When comparing the session average relative bid deviations to a zero vector, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the relative bid deviation is equal to zero.13 Moreover,
bid deviations do not change over time signiﬁcantly.14 Given these observations, truthful
bidding turns out to be a reasonably good prediction.
Buyer 1 has to choose between accepting the buyout price or going to the auction. In the
experiment, each buyer was confronted half of the time with buyout prices, which leaves
us with information about the acceptance behavior of each buyer for 16 periods. We ﬁnd
that only ﬁve out of 60 buyers (8%) behave according to the theoretical benchmark, i.e.,
accept buyout prices when their valuation exceeds the corresponding threshold value of
equation (4) and reject otherwise. The majority of buyers either accept buyout prices even
when their valuation is below the threshold value (57%) or reject buyout prices even when
their valuation is above the threshold value (18%), which obviously violates the theoretical
11A comparison between session averages of those variables reveals no signiﬁcant difference neither to the
benchmark prediction (MWU test: p = 0.45 for seller as well as buyer earnings; Sign-test: p = 0.62 for price
offers) nor between the ﬁrst half and the second half of the experiment (Wilcoxon signed rank test: p > 0.28 for
all variables).
12Comparing the acceptance rates on session level between ﬁrst and second half of the experiment reveals
that there are no signiﬁcant changes over time (MWU test: p = 0.729). Considering only buyout prices which
were below the valuation of buyers, 63% of all sales occur before the auction.
13MWU test: p = 0.114 for both, the ﬁrst and second part of the experiment.
14Wilcoxon signed rank test: p = 0.625 comparing session averages of ﬁrst and second part of the experiment.
8prediction.15
Sellers have to make only one decision: to choose the buyout price. Figure 1 presents the
density estimate of buyout prices ranging from 0.05 to 1. The vertical lines present visual
aids to compare our data to different theoretical benchmarks. The interval of buyout prices
included by the two solid lines present the (risk neutral) benchmark. The two dashed lines
describe the interval of buyout prices based on a model relaxing risk neutrality which we
will present below. Half of the buyout prices (48.4%) are conform with the risk neutral
theoretical prediction, i.e., are greater or equal to 0.50. However, the other half (51.6%)
of observed buyout prices is below 0.50, which is clearly not in line with the theoretical
benchmark.
All these observations indicate that the game theoretic model assuming homogeneous
and risk-neutral agents seems to be a good predictor for average buyout prices and proﬁts.
Nevertheless, it cannot very well rationalize observed individual decisions that appear to
drive the ﬁnding of successful sales at the buyout price.
This leaves us with the possibility that behavior might be based upon unobserved het-
erogeneity in subjects’ preferences. One possible explanation for the observed deviations
might be heterogeneity in risk preferences of both, sellers and buyers. Risk aversion might
explain, for instance, why the majority of buyers accept buyout prices, which yield a lower
proﬁt then the expected proﬁt from the auction and which a risk neutral buyer would have
rejected. On the other hand, buyout prices below the theoretical prediction might be driven
by risk aversion of sellers.
5 Risk Preferences
In this section we investigate whether and to what extent incorporating risk preferences into
the model can explain our experimental data. Therefore, all agents are assumed to be ex-
pected utility maximizers and have preferences that can be represented by a utility function
u(¢) which is twice differentiable, strictly increasing and satisﬁes u00(¢) · 0 everywhere on
its support. More precisely, for our analysis we restrict risk preferences to belong to the class
of constant relative risk aversion (hereafter CRRA), u(x) = x(1¡a)/(1 ¡ a), where a is the
Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk preferences.16,17
15The remaining 10 buyers (17%) could not be classiﬁed as the deviation of their behavior was not consistent,
i.e., the same person accepted buyout prices a risk neutral person would have rejected and would reject other
buyout prices a risk neutral person would have accepted.
16This speciﬁcation implies risk loving behavior for a < 0, risk neutrality for a = 0 and risk aversion for
a > 0. When a = 1, the natural logarithm, u(x) = ln(x), is used.
17Weexperimentedalsowithanexponentialutilityfunction, u(x) = 1¡exp¡ax, aspeciﬁcationwhichexhibits
constant absolute risk aversion (hereafter CARA). We found that the CRRA form of the utility function ﬁts our
data better than the CARA form (see footnote 22).
9Buyer
Allowing buyers to be risk averse might explain acceptance of buyout prices which lay
above expected price of the auction. In the following, we are going to investigate whether
the level of risk aversion needed to account for the observed acceptance behavior is reason-
able.
Given our distributional assumptions and functional form, the threshold price of a buyer
with risk preferences of a and valuation v is deﬁned by
e p(v) = v ¡
Ã
v(2¡a)
2¡ a
!(
1
1¡a)
.
Figure 2 plots the relation between threshold price and valuation for buyers with different
levels of risk preferences. A buyer who is risk neutral (a = 0) will never accept a buyout
price above 0.50, whereas a buyer who has risk preferences of a = 0.64 might accept buyout
prices up to 0.62. Note that the relation between threshold price and valuation might be
non-monotone. For example, a buyer with a = 0.64 will not only reject a buyout price of
0.60 if his valuation is lower than 0.73 but also if his valuation is higher than 0.95, implying
that a buyer with a very high valuation is more likely to go for the risky outcome from the
auction rather than to accept the certain outcome from the buyout option.18 If a buyer is
sufﬁciently risk averse, i.e. a ¸ 1, he would be willing to accept a buyout price equal to
his valuation.19 The threshold is shifted upwards with increasing levels of a implying that
higher buyout prices are more likely to be accepted the more risk averse a buyer is.
We can estimate the average risk preference of the buyer population directly from the
experimental data.20 In the model a buyer accepts a buyout price if
u(v ¡ p) + #1 ¸
Z v
0
u(v ¡ x)f(x)dx + #2 (6)
where we assume the unobservable error terms, #i with i 2 f1,2g, to follow a normal
distribution #i » N(0,s2). Assuming that risk preferences can be represented by u(x) =
x1¡a/(1¡ a), given the distributional assumptions and the decision rule in equation (6), we
estimate the risk preference parameter in the buyers’ population by maximum likelihood.21
18This non-monotonicity is driven by the choice of the utility function. With exponential utility, for example,
monotonicity of the threshold value - price relation is maintained.
19This is somewhat counterintuitive since in this case such a buyer would get zero payoff whereas by rejecting
he would have a chance of a positive net payoff. On the other hand, given the assumption of CRRA and the
speciﬁcation of the utility function, a buyer with a > 1 and a valuation between 0 and 1 will always have
negative net utility from entering the auction.
20Since we do not have enough data points to estimate the risk preference parameter of each individual buyer,
the analysis is based on pooled data and reﬂects behavior of the entire population assuming homogeneity and
stable preferences among buyers.
21For v ¸ p (N = 482) the choice probabilities are given by
Pr
Ã
# > ¡
1
1¡ a
Ã
(v ¡ p)(1¡a) ¡
v(2¡a)
2¡ a
!!
10The parameter estimate for buyers’ risk preferences is b a = 0.64 with a loglikelihood
function value of ¡288.61. The model assuming risk neutral buyers (ﬁxing a = 0), results in
a likelihood function value of ¡319.56. A likelihood ratio–test with a test value of 61.89 (5%
c2 critical value of 3.84) corroborates that allowing for risk preferences improves the ﬁt of
the data signiﬁcantly.22 Overall, buyers seem to react in a risk averse manner, which could
explain acceptance of high buyout prices.
The estimated level of buyers’ risk attitudes is in line with estimates reported in the liter-
ature. Numerous studies also based on responses of student subjects estimate average levels
of risk preferences to be around 0.3 ¡ 0.7 and to be quite robust to different decision envi-
ronments, e.g., gambles, other individual decision tasks, games, and auctions. For example,
CoxandOaxaca (1996), Goeree, HoltandPalfrey(2002), ChenandPlott(1998), and Ivanova-
Stenzel and Salmon (2004) estimate relative risk preferences from bids observed in private
value auction experiments to be a = 0.67,0.52,0.48, and 0.34, respectively. Goeree, Holt and
Palfrey (2003) and Holt and Laury (2002) use experimental data from individual decision
tasks to estimate risk parameters for each person. They ﬁnd the average risk attitudes to be
around 0.28 and 0.32, respectively.23
Seller
Contrary to the risk neutral case, we could not derive an explicit solution for the case of
general risk preferences for sellers. Nevertheless, we can solve numerically for optimal
buyout prices and derive the distribution of buyout prices for any given distribution of
agents’ risk attitudes. This also implies that we can only indirectly investigate whether risk
preferences improve the ﬁt of the model for sellers. We will do this by comparing predicted
buyout price distributions to the buyout prices observed in the experiment.
To derive quantitative buyout price predictions using “reasonable” levels of risk prefer-
ences, we rely on estimated risk preference distributions in the literature. In order to check
for the robustness of the predictions, we will use four different frequency distributions of
estimated individual risk preferences provided by the studies mentioned above (Cox and
Oaxaca (henceforth C&O) and Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (henceforth I&S) for auctions as
well as Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2003, henceforth G,H&P) and Holt and Laury (henceforth
H&L) for individual decision tasks. Estimated individual risk attitudes of those four stud-
ies lay in the interval ¡1.48 · a · 1.37 and characteristics of the distributions (10%,50%
and 90% quantiles) are reported in column 3 of Table 2.24 Based on these distributions we
with # = #1 ¡ #2 and # » N(0,1).
22 Modeling the decision using the exponential utility function results in a loglikelihood function value of
¡300.58. A comparison with the model applying the power utility function results in a likelihood ratio test
value of 23.94, indicating a signiﬁcant better ﬁt for the power function model.
23Holt and Laury compare different treatments with normal and extremely high payments. We concentrate
on their treatment with comparable real monetary incentives.
24H&L classify their participants in 9 categories. We assign all subjects within a category the mean of this
11simulate outcomes allowing for varying risk preferences of both, buyers and sellers.25 We
investigate the quantitative change in the decision variables and the expected amount of
accepted buyout prices.
Buyers will accept buyout prices up to 1 when they are extremely risk averse, i.e., a ¸ 1,
and only up to 0.45 when they are risk loving, i.e., a = ¡1.48, which is the lowest level
of the preference parameter estimates reported by the four studies. This translates into an
increase (decrease) of the maximum buyout price a risk neutral agent would accept by 100%
(¡10%). In order to determine the impact of risk on sellers’ price setting behavior, we
simulate buyout prices offered by sellers with different risk attitudes. Sellers calculate their
optimal buyout price given their own risk attitude and the distribution of risk preferences
within the buyer population. Figure 3 presents predicted buyout price frequencies for each
of the estimated population distributions of risk preferences. The range predicted by all
simulations is p 2 [0.43,0.69]. Compared to the benchmark case with risk neutral sellers
and risk neutral buyers, this range is smaller in size and is shifted downwards. However,
the lowest buyout price is 0.43 and thus still close to the prediction for risk neutral agents
of 0.5. The stronger decrease of the upper bound from 1.0 to 0.69 can be explained by the
fact that when buyers are risk averse even high buyout prices have a chance of still being
accepted. The seller can therefore increase his proﬁt by keeping buyout prices high yet
affordable for risk averse buyers.
Medians and quantiles of simulated buyout prices are reported in Table 2. Medians of
simulated buyout prices are similar between studies (0.55 (G,H,&P), 0.53 (H&L), 0.54 (C&O)
and 0.51 (I&S)), however, simulated buy prices based on parameter estimates elicited via
lottery choices (G,H&P and H&L) are spread more widely than those based on auction data
(C&O and I&S). Column 4b of Table 2 reports acceptance rates given the simulated price
distributions and the distribution of risk preferences among buyers. Predicted acceptance
rates of buyout prices vary between 17.6% and 36.9%.
Thus, allowing for general risk preferences opens a price ﬂoor within which agreements
are possible at the buyout price. The exact magnitude depends, however, on the particular
preference distribution.
The acceptance rate of 33% observed in our experiment lies within the range of pre-
dicted acceptance rates with heterogeneous agents. The median buyout price observed in
the experiment is 0.49 and thus close to the predicted median buyout prices (0.51 ¡ 0.55).
However, allowing for heterogeneous risk preferences seems only slightly to improve the
explanatory power of the model for sellers. The interval of buyout prices p 2 [0.43,0.69]
including all predictions covers more than half of observed buyout prices (56%) (see Figure
category as individual risk parameter. Subjects in the outer categories a < ¡0.95 and a > 1.37 were assigned
a = ¡0.95 and a = 1.37. We do the same for G,H&P who distinguish between 7 risk categories, with a < ¡0.56
and a > 0.93 as lower and upper bound.
25We assume common knowledge about the population distribution of risk attitudes, which is assumed to be
the same for both, buyers and sellers.
121), which is an improvement by 8% with regard to the (risk neutral) benchmark predic-
tion. Still, almost half of the buyout prices remain unexplained. Buyout prices in lower
and higher ranges are much more dispersed than predicted. A Pearson Goodness of ﬁt test
strongly rejects the prediction of the model for each of the estimated distributions.26
Furthermore, whereas buyout prices above 0.69 could still be explained by the risk neu-
tral benchmark, buyout prices below 0.43 are not captured by any of the two models. What
is puzzling is that those low offers comprise 29% of all buyout prices. This fraction is not
only stable over time but is generally caused by the same sellers:27 One third of all sellers
offer buyout prices below 0.43 more than half of the time.
6 Discussion
In the previous section we have shown that allowing for risk preferences can theoretically
explain the existence of successful sales at the buyout price, i.e., before the auction. Partic-
ipants’ comments in the post–experimental questionnaire conﬁrm that risk attitudes might
indeed drive the offer of low or the acceptance of high buyout prices. For example, some
participants in the seller’s role were concerned about the auction because it generated “too
volatile prices” and mentioned that they favored an agreement at the buyout price. Partici-
pants in the role of buyers emphasized that they preferred to exercise the buyout option as
“the chance of buying the item seemed to be higher.” The analysis of the experimental data
shows, however, that behavior can only partly be explained by agents’ risk attitudes. Even
though, relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality improves signiﬁcantly the ﬁt for buy-
ers’ behavior, it is not sufﬁcient to explain sellers’ behavior. Observed buyout prices vary
much more than predicted with a substantial amount of buyout prices outside the predicted
interval.
One might be tempted to explain the excess variance in buyout prices with noise in
behavior. There are two problems with this argument. First, the observed distribution of
buyout prices is far from uniform, as would be required by a model where sellers randomly
choose across all possible price offers. Second, noise would presumably decline over time
as participants have the opportunity to learn and adjust their buyout prices during the 32
periods of the experiment. Nevertheless, the distribution of observed buyout prices remains
stable over time, with systematically under- and overpricing compared to the theoretical
predictions.
Another possible way to look at our results is in light of the bargaining literature investi-
gating environments with asymmetric information. For example, Samuelson and Bazerman
26The Pearson Goodness of Fit test, also known as c2-Test, requires independent observations. As different
price offers of an individual seller might not fulﬁl this requirement, we use mean price offers of individual
sellers for the test.
27A comparison of the fraction of low offers between the ﬁrst and second part of the experiment reveals no
signiﬁcant changes (Wilcoxon signed rank test: p = 0.977).
13(1985) show that subjects systematically deviate from the predicted behavior and fall prey
to the “winner’s curse,” in the sense that they either enter into loss–making purchases or
forgo proﬁt–making opportunities. The latter might apply also to our experimental situa-
tion where the seller (the uninformed party) has to condition his behavior on the strategic
reaction of buyer 1 (his informed opponent).
In our experiment a seller faces a cognitively very demanding decision task. First, he
has to consider buyers’ acceptance threshold values. Second, conditional on these threshold
values, he has to calculate his own expected utility for different buyout prices choosing the
price offer that maximizes this utility. Such reasoning requires that sellers not only optimize
but also correctly condition their buyout price on the buyer’s reaction.
Let us consider, for example, a risk neutral seller who does not condition on the buyer’s
reaction. From the point of view of such a (boundedly rational) seller any accepted buyout
price, p, which is above the expected proﬁt from the auction will be preferable. Such seller
has to ensure that his price offer is above the expected auction proﬁt and will be accepted
with positive probability such that E(pA) · p · E(v). For example, with E(pA) = 1/3 and
E(v) = 1/2, a non–conditioning seller might offer prices between 1/3 · p · 1/2.
Following this argument we can not only explain the existence of low buyout prices but
also the fact that the observed under pricing remains stable over time. Suppose a seller
neglects the strategic reaction of a buyer towards his own buyout price and uses solely his
experience to build his expectations. A seller who offers low buyout prices in order to avoid
low (expected) outcomes in the auction is more likely to experience low proﬁts in the auc-
tion. Buyers with relatively high values will accept low buyout prices, but buyers who can-
not even afford those low price offers, reject and go to the auction. This leads to the selection
of low value buyers into the auction and consequently to low auction prices, reinforcing the
seller’s expectation about low prospects of the auction. In order to form correct experience-
based beliefs about auction proﬁts, sellers would need to experiment with different buyout
prices. Experimentation might be costly in the short run (because of foregone proﬁt oppor-
tunities) and might therefore deliberately not be chosen by decision makers (Einhorn and
Hoghart, 1981). However, if a seller is not willing to “invest” in learning, he might form
wrong expectations about the relation between demanded buyout price and ﬁnal proﬁts.
Intheanswerstothepost–experimentalquestionnairewefoundsomeevidencesupport-
ing the possibility that subjects in our experiment fall pray to such “seller’s curse.” Some
sellers indeed argued that the “auction generated too low prices” and that this was the rea-
son why they preferred to reach an agreement before the auction. However, our data does
not allow to test this conjecture directly. Experimental investigations of this issue and other
behavioral explanations might yield promising answers and further insights in behavior in
such hybrid mechanisms.28
28We plan to pursue such investigations in our future research.
147 Summary
In this paper, we study a dynamic trade institution that combines an auction with a take-
it-or-leave-it price offer, the so called buyout option. Under standard assumptions, sales
should always take place in the auction rendering the existence of the buyout option obso-
lete. An experimental test of the theory suggested that the theoretical benchmark can very
well predict average buyout prices and proﬁts in such combined mechanism. However, per-
sistent departure from the theoretical prediction at the individual level, i.e., offering too low
or accepting too high buyout prices, resulted in a substantial volume of transactions before
the auction. This ﬁnding led us to explore other behavioral explanations in order to account
for the observed deviations.
First, we showed that allowing for individual heterogeneity in risk preferences for both
market sides might lead to sales before the auction. This result seems to be driven rather
by risk aversion of buyers than of sellers as risk averse buyers accept higher buyout prices
more frequently. Sellers, on the other side, lower their buyout price only marginally below
the lowest price set by risk neutral sellers. By using existing population estimates of risk
preference parameters we were able to make quantitative predictions about the distribu-
tion of sellers’ price offers and acceptance behavior of buyers. When we compared these
predictions to the experimental data, however, we found that behavior can only partly be
explained by agents’ risk preferences. Relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality improves
the ﬁt of the model for buyers, but cannot account for a substantial part of individual sellers’
decisions. This is especially striking for low price offers. Even though participants gained
experience during the experiment, they did not increase their buyout prices, thus their proﬁt
opportunities.
We therefore discussed an alternative explanation of individual seller behavior. An im-
portant issue seems to be whether sellers are aware of the information asymmetry: If sellers
fail to anticipate buyers’ strategic reaction to their buyout price they might choose buyout
prices which are too low and forgo proﬁt–making opportunities, a fallacy which resembles
the winner’s curse in negotiations.
158 Appendix
A Instructions
The original instructions are in German and available upon request. What follows is the translated
main part of the instructions explaining the decision task. In the beginning of the instructions,
participants were informed that instructions were the same for everybody and that any decision made
would be anonymous. At the end of the instructions, participants were also informed that gains and
losses from all periods would be added, that the exchange rate from ECU (Experimental Currency
Units) to EURO was: 40 ECU = 1 EURO, and that buyers would receive an initial endowment of 5
EURO. The main part of the instructions read as follows:
In every period one person (a seller) offers two other persons (buyers) a ﬁctitious com-
modity for sale. At the beginning of the experiment each participant is randomly assigned
to a role (seller or buyer) and keeps this role throughout the entire experiment.
All valuations are denoted in a ﬁctitious Experimental Currency Unit (ECU). In each
period the private value for the product of each buyer, v, is independently drawn from the
interval 0 · v · 100, with every integer number between 0 and 100 being equally likely.
Each buyer is informed only about his own private value and will not get to know the
private value of the other buyer. The seller is not informed about the private values of the
buyers.
Each period consists of either one or two stages and proceeds as follows:
In the ﬁrst stage, the seller bargains with one of the two buyers. He makes a price offer (in
the range from 0 to 100) to this buyer. The buyer can either accept or reject this price offer.
1.) If he accepts, then he pays the price and receives the product. The period is terminated.
The buyer’s proﬁt is the difference between his private value for the product and the price.
The seller receives the price. The other buyer (who has not participated in the bargaining)
does not receive anything and does not pay anything, i.e., he makes a zero proﬁt.
2.) If he rejects then the period proceeds to the second stage. In the second stage, an auction
takes place with the seller and the two buyers. Both buyers submit simultaneously their
bids. The bidder with the highest bid buys the commodity. The price he has to pay is
equal to the second highest bid. His proﬁt is the difference between his private value for
the product and the price. The seller receives the price. The bidder who submits the second
highest bid does not receive anything and does not pay anything, i.e., he makes a zero proﬁt.
If both bids are equal, the buyer is chosen by the ﬂip of a fair coin. In this case the second
highest bid is equal to the highest bid.
Each participant receives the following information: After the ﬁrst (bargaining) stage the
seller and both buyers are informed whether the sale takes place.
1.) In case of a sale, the parties involved in the negotiation (the seller and one of the buyers)
are informed about the price and own proﬁts in this period. In addition all participants are
informed about their own total proﬁt up to this period.
2.) In case of a second (auction) stage the seller and both buyers are informed about the
winner of the auction, the price which has to be paid by the buyer, the own proﬁt in this
period, and the own total proﬁt up to this period.
16In each period, trading groups (one seller and two buyers) are formed randomly. Alto-
gether, there will be 32 periods, which consist of 4 cycles of 8 trading periods. After each
cycle buyers who participated in the ﬁrst (bargaining) stage will change and participate only
in the auction and vice versa.
B Figures and Tables
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
Price Offer 
Figure 1: Buyout price density estimation, gaussian kernel
Solid lines represent the interval of optimal buyout prices assuming risk neutral agents. Dashed lines represent
the interval of buyout prices predicted by the simulation for agents with heterogeneous risk preferences
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Figure 2: Relation between threshold price and valuation for different levels of risk aversion
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“G, H & P”-Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2003), “H & L”–Holt and Laury (2002),
“C & O”–Cox and Oaxaca (1996), “I & S”–Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004)
18(1) (2) (3) (4)
cycle Number Buyout price Accept- Proﬁts Efﬁ-
of obser- ance rate Seller Buyer\ ciency
vations Mean (StD.) (in %) Mean (StD.) Mean (StD.) (in %)
1 240 0.53 (0.17) 35 0.34 (0.19) 0.14 (0.21) 80.4
2 240 0.51 (0.18) 35 0.32 (0.20) 0.16 (0.23) 85.0
3 240 0.52 (0.18) 28 0.33 (0.19) 0.16 (0.23) 87.9
4 240 0.50 (0.16) 36 0.32 (0.18) 0.16 (0.23) 86.7
all 960 0.51 (0.17) 33 0.33 (0.19) 0.15 (0.22) 85.0
Theory: 0.5 · p · 1 0 0.33 0.17 100
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for all periods and per cycle (1 cycle = 8 periods) and theoreti-
cal predictions
(\ Number of observations=480 per cycle, since there were two buyers per trading round)
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b)
Study Sample Distribution of Prediction of
Size a–Estimates Buyout prices (p) Accept-
Quantiles Quantiles ance rate
10% 50% 90% 10% 50% 90% (in %)
G, H & P 42 ¡0.38 0.14 0.89 0.48 0.55 0.68 17.6
H & L 175 0 0.28 0.83 0.48 0.53 0.56 21.2
C & O 40 0.37 0.72 0.92 0.53 0.54 0.56 36.9
I & S 55 ¡0.17 0.46 0.72 0.51 0.51 0.56 25.8
Table 2: Summary of different studies
(Col. 1): “G,H&P”-Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2003), “H&L”–Holt and Laury (2002), “C&O”–Cox and
Oaxaca (1996), “I&S”–Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004); (Col. 3): reported distribution of individ-
ual risk preference estimates; (Col. 4a and 4b): predicted buyout price distributions and acceptance
rates based on those estimates
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